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Trerilla: Seat Belt Defense

THE EMERGING SEAT BELT
DEFENSE: TWO VIEWS

Roberts v. Bohn,
26 Ohio App. 2d 50, 269 N.E. 2d 53 (1971)

The courts have recently been concerned
with the new problem of whether the law of torts
imposes a legal obligation upon individuals to
wear seat belts. The seat belt defense is in its
formative years. It was first presented less than
a decade ago, and has since been presented in
approximately fifty cases. To date, less than half
of the judicial jurisdictions in the country have
considered the defense.
Due to the initiation of this relatively recent
development of tort law and the generally
inconsistent court decisions, the Editorial Board
believes the Review's function will best be served
by presenting the following two analyses of the
same case. Although the two authors do not take
diametrically opposed positions, their analytical
approach and conclusions are not in complete
accord.
It is our hope that this technique will
enlighten the practicing bar, the judiciary and the
legal scholar concerning the emergence of this
new tort law principle.

[129]
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I. WHAT THE COURTS HAVE DONE AND WHY
a
OBERTS v. BoHN' was an action for personal injuries sustained by
passenger in a motor vehicle which was involved in an accident with
another motor wzhicle. The jury rendered a unanimous verdict for the
defendant. Th. plaintiff appealed on several questions of law, one of
which concern d the questioning of plaintiff on cross-examination as to
whether she was wearing an available seat belt, and her admission that
she was not w:aring a seat belt at the time of the accident. Plaintiff's
counsel objected to such testimony as irrelevant, but the trial court ruled
that the testimony could remain.

R

The Court of Appeals, in Roberts, noted that Ohio has enacted
legislation 2 which requires all motor vehicles manufactured after January
1, 1962, to be equipped with seat belts. The court further indicated that
Bertsch v. Spears3 held that section 4513.262, of the Ohio Revised Code,
does not require the wearing of seat belts, and that the failure to wear seat
belts is not negligence per se. The appellate court, in Roberts, held, inter
alia, that the questioning of plaintiff on cross-examination in regard to
her nonuse of an available seat belt was irrelevant, and that the trial court
erred in not striking this testimony from the record. The court concluded,
however, that since defendant's counsel did not mention the failure of
plaintiff to wear a seat belt in the closing argument, and since the trial
court did not charge the jury on contributory negligence as to the nonuse
of the seat belt, the error, standing alone, was not sufficiently prejudicial
4
to warrant a new trial. It was expressly indicated in the court's charge5
that the seat belt defense was disfavored by the members of its bench.
The court's decision was in accord with the majority of the cases in
other jurisdictions; to wit: (1) the determination as to whether an
occupant of an automobile should or should not be required to wear a
seat belt should be left to the legislature, (2) in the absence of a statute
to the contrary, there is no common law duty imposed upon an occupant
of a motor vehicle to wear a seat belt in ordinary highway travel, and
(3) the failure to use an available seat belt is not contributory negligence
as a matter of law. Therefore, evidence as to the nonuse of a seat belt is
generally inadmissible in an action for personal injuries arising out of an
automobile accident.
The court reasoned that, normally, there is no connection between
the nonuse of seat belts and the cause of the accident; therefore, a
126 Ohio App. 2d 50, 269 N.E. 2d 53 (1971).
2 OHio REv. CODE §4513.262 (Supp. 1965).
3 20 Ohio App. 2d 137, 252 N.E. 2d 194 (1969).

4 26 Ohio App. 2d at 58, 269 N.E. 2d at 59.
5Id.
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defendant should not escape the legal consequence of his negligence by
imputing negligence to the plaintiff due to the plaintiff's failure to use
an available seat belt. 6 It must be noted that the reasoning process employed by the court - since nonuse of a seat belt is not connected to
the cause of the accident, the nonuse does not constitute contributory
negligence is illogical under tort law prin:ipl-u. The question is
whether there is a connection between the nonuse of a seat belt and the
cause of the injury sustained.7 It is therefore suggested that the courts
that have used such faulty reasoning have done so in order to arrive at
what is considered a just result; namely, the nonuse of a -eat belt sbould
not constitute contributory negligence and bar recovery. The court se.med
influenced by the fact that if the failure to wear available seat be!Ls
should be considered negligence, and defendant establizhe l by credible
evidence that a specified portion of plaintiff's injuries, no matter how
minimal, were the direct and proximate result of the omission to wear
an available seat belt, then the plaintiff would be precluded from any
recovery under the contributory negligence doctrine. 8 The court rejected
the contention that because it is common knowledge that in automobile
accidents personal injuries or death may result, persons occupying automobiles have a duty to wear available seat belts for their own safety.9
The rejection was based on two premises. First, that there is material
controversy as to whether the use of seat belts sufficiently contributes to
the safety of persons wearing them, and second, there exists a lack of
acceptance of the use of seat belts by a substantial percentage of the
public.10 The court indicated that even if a general acceptance as to
the value of, and need for, seat belts prevailed, there would evolve a
significant question in regard to the existence of a legal duty to wear
them, in -the absence of a statute to the contrary."' This is because "an
automobile is not an inherently dangerous instrumentality,"'12 and "only
becomes dangerous because of its negligent operation or because it is
allowed to be out of repair."' 3 Finally, the court noted that an individual
may rightfully assume that others will observe the law and use ordinary
care; therefore, action based on this assumption, in the absence of
contrary knowledge or notice, is not negligence.' 4 Thus, in the absence
of a statute to the contrary, there is no duty, on the part of an automobile

6 ld. at 57, 269 N.E. 2d at 58-59.
7 W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS, §65

(4th ed. 1971).
8 Id. at 57, 269 N.E. 2d at 58.
9 Id. at 57, 269 N.E. 2d at 59.
10 Id.
n Id.
12 Williamson v. Eclipse Motor Lines, Inc., 145 Ohio St. 467, 62 N.E. 2d 339 (1945).
13 Feiss v. Hensch, 28 Ohio App. 42, 162 N.E. 456 (1927).
14 Swoboda v. Brown, 129 Ohio St. 512, 196 N.E. 274 (1935).
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occupant, to foresee another's negligence and thereby protect himself by
5
using an available seat belt. It appears as if Ohio, in rejecting the
"seat belt defense" has seemingly joined the ranks of the majority
view. An investigation as -to how the seat belt issue has been litigated
in other jurisdictions may be enlightening.
RELEVANT CASES
The case ratio seems to be significantly against the acceptance of the
seat belt defense. It should be noted, however, that in some cases" the seat
belt defense was rejected on some basis other than the actual merits of the
defense. Notwithstanding the aforementioned cases, there has been litigation in which courts seemingly reject the seat belt defense on the merits.
17
In a notable Louisiana decision, a Court of Appeals held that the
plaintiff who was thrown from his car, due to a collision with defendant's
car, was not guilty of contributory negligence in failing to utilize an
available seat belt. The court concluded that the plaintiff's nonuse of the
available seat belt did not contribute to the occurrence of the accident
8
and was not the proximate cause of the accident.' It was further indicated
that a statutory mandate, prescribing that failure to use an available seat
belt would be negligence per se, is needed in order to find nonuse of an
19
available seat belt as constituting a proximate cause of the accident.
have rejected the seat belt defense on essentially
Other jurisdicions
20
the same grounds.
1526 Ohio App. 2d at 58, 269 N.E. 2d at 59.
16 See generally Fontenot v. Fidelity & Cas. Co. of N.Y., 217 So. 2d 702 (La. App.
1969); Schomer v. Madigan, 120 Ill. App. 2d 107, 225 N.E. 2d 620 (1970) (Plaintiff's
nonuse of an available seat belt was not established); Brown v. Bryan, 419 S.W. 2d
62 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1967) (There was no request that the trier of fact be instructed as
to the seat belt issue); Lentz v. Schafer, 404 F. 2d 516 (7th Cir. 1968) (The pleadings
failed to raise the seat belt defense).
17Lawrence v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 213 So. 2d 784 (La. App. 1968).
18

Id. at 786-787.

'9

Id. at 786.

2oSee generally Cierpisz v. Singleton, 247 Md. 215, 230 A. 2d 629 (1967). Here, a

Maryland Court of Appeals held that failure to wear an available seat belt is not
negligence per se since the state statute, MD. ANN. CODE Art. 66%, §12-412 (repl. vol.
1970), required only installation and not use of the belts; and that, in the absence of
proof that plaintiff's injuries were caused or aggravated by his nonuse of the belt, the
trial court properly refused to submit the question of contributory negligence to
the jury; Brown v. Kendrick, 192 So. 2d 49 (Fla. App. 1966). A Florida appellate
court held, inter alia, that plaintiff's nonuse of an available seat belt neither
contributed to the occurrence of the accident nor was the proximate cause of the
injuries sustained; therefore, the trial court properly refused to allow the defendant to
offer evidence as to plaintiff's nonuse of seat belts as constituting contributory
negligence; Myles v. Lee, 209 So. 2d 533 (La. App. 1968); Barry v. Coca Cola Co.,
99 N.J. Super. 270, 239 A. 2d 273 (1967). Both courts held that the nonuse of an
available seat belt at the time of the accident, by the plaintiff, was no defense since
such nonuse was not a contributing factor in the occurrence of the accident.
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The contention that nonuse of an available seat belt constitutes
contributory negligence has been rejected on other grounds. The Supreme
Court of New York has held, 21 inter alia, that the nonuse of an available
seat belt did not raise an inference of contributory negligence since such
nonuse did not contribute to the occurrence of the accident which caused
the injuries. The court concluded that it was up to the legislature to
determine whether the wearing of seat belts is to be mandatory, and
whether the failure to utilize them shall preclude recovery. In Noth v.
Scheurer 22 it was indicated that under New York law, a failure to use an
available seat belt is not related to the cause of the accident and therefore
is not considered as contributory negligence. The court noted that there
was no New York authority which holds that there is a duty to wear a seat
belt.23 The court did indicate, however, that nonuse of seat belts may be
a causative factor in determining the extent of damages that the plain24
tiff would be entitled to recover.
The advocates of the seat belt defense have attempted to invoke the
doctrine of avoidable consequences in an effort to mitigate damages.
An Indiana appellate court has held,25 inter alia, that plaintiff's failure to use an available seat belt is not contributory negligence as a
matter of law. The defendant contended that nonuse of an available seat
belt is a bar to recovery due to the doctrine of avoidable consequences.
Defendant's argument was essentially that where one person has committed a tort against another, it is incumbent upon the latter to utilize
such means as are reasonable under the circumstances in an effort to avoid
or minimize the damages. The aggrieved party is therefore denied recovery
for any item of damage which could have been avoided. 26 The court
concluded that the doctrine was not a defense, but was merely a rule of
damages.2 The court did speculate, however, that the doctrine might
possibly apply to some future case in which it was clearly shown that a
specified part of the injury would not have occurred except for the fact
that plaintiff failed to avoid the consequence of the tort by not fastening
his seat belt. 28 The doctrine of avoidable consequences, as applied to the

21

Dillon v. Humphreys, 56 Misc. 2d 211, 288 N.Y.S. 2d 14 (1968).

285 F. Supp. 81 (E.D. N.Y. 1968).
23 Id. at 85.
22

Id.
Kavanagh v. Butorac, 140 Ind. App. 139, 221 N.E. 2d 824 (1966). But see Mays v.
Dealers Transit, Inc., 441 F. 2d 1344 (7th Cir. 1971), where the U.S. Court of
Appeals held, under Indiana law, that the use of seat belts is sufficiently involved in
the matter of exercise of reasonable care; therefore Indiana law does not preclude the
trier of fact from considering the seat belt issue.
24

25

26 C. MCCORMICK, DAMAGES,

§33 (1935).

140 Ind. App. at 149, 221 N.E. 2d at 830,
28 Id.
27
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plaintiff's nonuse of an available seat belt, has been argued, without
suczess. in otr'-- jurisdictions.2 9
In order for the seat belt defense to emerge as a viable defense
th-ory, ;t must .,e established that there is a legal duty to wear seat belts.
30
The Supreme Court of North Carolina has held, inter alia, that since
due care is measured by the conduct of the reasonably prudent man, the
scant us- which the average motorist makes of his seat belt plus the fact
that there is no standard for deciding when it is negligent not to use an
available seat belt, indicates that no duty should be imposed upon motor31
ists to use them during routine highway travel. The court noted that
32
if such duty is to be imposed, it should be by legislation. The court
reasoned that in jurisdictions that do not employ the doctrine of comparative negligence, it would be unduly harsh and unsound to invoke a rule
that would preclude all recovery to a plaintiff whose mere failure to use
an available seat belt did not contribute to the occurrence of an accident,
and to exonerate the tort-feasor but for whose negligence the plaintiff's
omission would have been harmless.33 The court did indicate, however,
that conceivably a situation could arise in which a plaintiff's failure to
34
use an available seat belt might constitute negligence. Such a situation,
in the court's opinion, must involve circumstances where a plaintiff
with prior knowledge of a specific hazard - one not generally associated
with highway travel and one from which a seat belt would have protected him - had failed to use his seat belt. The court indicated that if
this were the case, whether such conduct be called assumption of risk or
contributory negligence, it would preclude recovery. The court's conclu2

9See Lipscomb v. Diamiani, 226 A. 2d 914 (Del. 1967), where a Superior Court of
Delaware concluded that since contributory negligence occurs either before or at the
time of the wrongful act or omission of the defendant, and the avoidable consequence
arises after the wrongful act of the defendant, then the seat belt issue is not controlled
by the doctrine of avoidable consequences because the failure to fasten the seat belt
occurred before defendant's negligence and before plaintiff's injury. Therefore, the
failure to use an available seat belt is not grounds for a reduction of the plaintiff's
damages. See also Romankewiz v. Black, 16 Mich. App. 119, 167 N.W. 2d 606
(1969), where a Michigan court of appeals held that plaintiff has no duty to use a
seat belt, and the failure to do such is not contributory negligence, and is not
appropriate as a damage-mitigating factor under the avoidable consequences doctrine.
The court reasoned that an unbuckled seat belt does not cause an accident, and since
there is no duty to buckle the failure to do such cannot be deemed a breach of duty
to avoid consequences or minimize damages.
30 Miller v. Miller, 273 N.C. 228, 160 S.E. 2d 65 (1968).
31273 N.C. at 238, 160 S.E. 2d at 73.
32 Other courts have also indicated that the determination as to whether an occupant
of a car involved in normal every day driving should or should not be required to
wear a seat belt should be left to the legislature. See Lipscomb v. Diamiani, 226 A.
2d 914 (Del. 1967); Romankewiz v. Black, 16 Mich. App. 119, 167 N.W. 2d 606
(1969); Dillon v. Humphreys 56 Misc. 2d 211, 288 N.Y.S. 2d 14 (1968); Robinson
v. Lewis, 254 Ore. 52, 457 P. 2d 483 (1969).
33 273 N.C. at 233, 160 S.E. 2d at 73.
34 Id. at 238, 160 S.E. 2d at 70.
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sion that, since there is no duty to use seat belts, nonuse does not constitute a defense, has been upheld in other jurisdictions. 35
A difficult problem exists as to the production of eviden:e indicating
that use of a seat belt would have prevented or reluzed the injuries
sustained. The Supreme Court of South Carolina upheld, 38 in!er alia, the
trial court's decision to strike from the pleadings the defendant's
affirmative defense of contributory negligence in that plaintiff omitted to
utilize an available seat belt. The Supreme Court's decision was based on
the fact that there was no evidence indicating that plaintiff's failure to use
an available seat belt contributed in any way to the occurrence of the
accident, or that the injuries would have been reduced if the seat belt had
been worn.3 7 It should be noted that the South Carolina Supreme Court
has seemingly overruled a decision it had rendered three years previously3 8
where it had held that the defendant's pleadings, which alleged that the
plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence in failing to wear an
available seat belt, should not have been stricken by the trial judge.
There are cases in which the courts have accepted, in varying
degrees, the validity of the seat belt defense. The defense has prevailed in
some courts by a finding that there is a legal duty to wear seat belts. The
Supreme Court of Wisconsin and an appellate court in Illinois have
held,39 inter alia, that although it is not negligence per se to fail to use
an available seat belt - since the statutory standard requires only the
installation of seat belts in the vehicle - there is a duty to use available
seat belts based on the common law standard of ordinary care. Both
courts reasoned that it is obvious that persons using seat belts are less
likely to sustain injury, and if injured, the injury is likely to be less serious.
Consequently, an occupant of a motor vehicle either knows or should
know of the additional safety factor produced by using seat belts. The
Wisconsin Supreme Court in Bentzler,4 stressed that the appropriate jury
question is not whether plaintiff's negligent failure to use the seat belt
contributed to the cause of the accident, but whether it contributed to
the injuries sustained. Therefore, there must be a causal relation between
the negligent nonuse of the seat belt and its contribution to the injuries.
35

See Woods v. Smith, 296 F. Supp. 1128 (N.D. Fla. 1969), where a U.S. District
Court in Florida held, Under Oklahoma law, that there is no duty on the part of an

occupant of an automobile to use an available seat belt; therefore, it is improper
to
submit this issue to the jury. See also Robinson v. Lewis, 254 Ore. 52, 457 P. 2d
483
(1969), where the Oregon Supreme Court declared that there is no common
law duty
to wear seat belts in ordinary vehicular travel.
36 Jones v. Dague, 252 S.C. 261, 166 S.E. 2d 99 (1969).
371d. at 271, 166 S.E. 2d at 103-104.
38 Sams v. Sams, 247 S.C. 467, 148 S.E. 2d 154, noted in 15 A.L.R.
3d 1423 (1966).
39 Bentzler v. Braun, 34 Wis. 2d 362, 149 N.W. 2d 626 (1967); Mount
v. McClellan,
91 Ill. App. 2d 1, 234 N.E. 2d 329 (1968).
40 34 Wis. 2d at 387, 149 N.W. 2d at 640.
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Although most courts have seemingly been reluctant to invoke the
doctrine of contributory negligence for nonuse of an available seat belt,
was
the doctrine has been employed by some courts. In Texas, recovery
41
denied to a plaintiff who omitted to use an available seat belt. An expert
witness testified that if the belt had been worn, -the plaintiff would not
have hit the windshield. The jury concluded that the plaintiff was guilty
of contributory negligence and that 95% of his injuries would have been
avoided if the belt had been worn. In another Texas case42 an appellate
court declared that the duty to use an available seat belt, if any, should
be considered in mitigation of damages rather than as contributory negligence.43 The court reasoned that the seat belt issue should be considered
in connection with damages rather than liability because the nonuse of
an available seat belt may cause or aggravate the injury, but would not
be a contributing cause to the accident.
The seat belt defense has not met the aforementioned obstacles when
litigated in a comparative negligence jurisdiction. Perhaps the defense
has a better chance of succeeding in such a jurisdiction because contributing negligence on the part of a plaintiff is not a total bar to recovery.
The defense is aimed at damage mitigation, and these courts are well
acquainted with this kind of approach. Two Wisconsin cases,44 under
the comparative negligence doctrine, have held the plaintiff guilty of
negligence for nonuse of an available seat belt.
Many of the aforementioned cases made reference to the apparent
lack of legislation as to the seat belt issue. It would indeed be quite helpful
to investigate the statutes that have been enacted in regard to seat belts.
RELEVANT STATUTES
Of the twenty-nine states45 that have enacted legislation requiring
the installation or equipment of seat belts, none explicitly require the occupant of the motor vehicle to use them. Fourteen states4 merely require

41Vernon v. Droeste (District Court of Brazos County, Tex., 1966), reported in 7
FOR Tr DEFENSE, No. 7 (Sept 1966).
42

Sonnier v. Ramsey, 424 S.W. 2d 684 (Tex. App. 1968).

43 Id. at 689.

44 Busick v. Budner, reported in 7 FOR THE DEFENSE, No. 6, June 1966; Stockinger
v. Dunisch (Sheboygan Cty. Cir. Ct., Wisconsin, 1964) discussed in 5 FOR THE
DEFENSE, "Defense Dicta," 79, Sept. 1964.
45 See Appendix I, infra.
46 See Appendix I infra. A typical example of this type of statute is found in GEORGIA
CODE ANN. §68-1801 (1964), which indicates that after January 1, 1964, no new
private passenger automobile is to be sold to the public unless equipped with two sets
of seat belts in the front seat.
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that seat belts be equipped within the vehicle. Fifteen states 47 require
seat belts to be installed for use. There are five states 48 which specify
that a failure to use a safety belt, after installation, is not to be considered
as negligence or that evidence as to nonuse of a seat belt is inadmissible.
These five states have statutes which therefore indicate that the nonuse
of an available seat belt is not to be used as a standard of care in a civil
action. There are, however, two statutes49 which require the use of seat
belts; but, these enactments apply only to the drivers of certain public
transportation, government vehicles, and to occupants of driver -training
vehicles.
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF ROBERTS

v. BOHN

The significance of Roberts lies in its implications for the future of
the seat belt defense in Ohio. In the cases which indicate that a plaintiff's
nonuse of an available seat belt raised a jury question of contributory
negligence the material factors were: 50 (1) a judicial finding that a duty
exists to use ordinary care by "buckling up" one's belt, and (2) credible
evidence that seat belts prevent, reduce, or minimize injuries.
The Ohio court, in Roberts, rejected the above factors in favor of
the arguments used in holding that a plaintiff's failure to use an available
seat belt is not contributory negligence: 51 (1) the affirmative defense of
contributory negligence should be eliminated or contracted, not expanded,
(2) because it is not clearly shown that the use of seat belts do in fact
protect the wearer, the argument that nonuse is contributory negligence
is conjectural; (3) the legislature should decide if seat belts are to be
worn, and (4) a plaintiff need not foresee the possible negligence of
others because he has the right to assume that other people will not
act in a negligent manner.
Finally, the court, in Roberts, has concurred with another rationale
used to reject the seat belt defense; that is, notwithstanding the evidence
supporting the beneficial results of seat belt use, acceptance of the seat
belt by the public has not been realized. As a result, the social utility of
47

See Appendix I infra. A typical example of this kind of statute is found in INDiANA
STATUTES ANN. 47, §2241 (1963), which indicates that it is unlawful to buy, sell etc.

an automobile (starting with the 1964 models)

unless the automobile is equipped

with safety belts installed for use in the front seat.
48 See Appendix I infra. An example of this type of statute is Virginia's statute,
VMGINI CODE 46.1-309.1 (Supp. 1970) which reads: "Failure to use such safety belt
after installation shall not be deemed to be negligence." Another example is IowA
CODE ANN. 321.445 (1965) which reads: "The fact of use, or nonuse, of seat belts
by a person shall not be admissible or material as evidence in civil actions brought
for damages."
49 See R.I. GEN. LAWS §31-23-41 (Supp. 1963); COL. VEH. CODE §27304 (Supp. 1970).
50 See 42 Omio BAR 2 at 26 (1969).
51 Id. at 29,
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wearing a seat belt must be established in the mind of the public before
nonuse can be deemed as negligence. Otherwise, the courts would be
imposing a standard52of conduct rather than applying a standard of care
accepted by society.
It appears as if Ohio will remain with the majority view in regard
to the seat belt defense issue. The result for Ohio motorists might in
fact be that a driver or passenger of a motor vehicle may be risking
either life or aggravated injury by not buckling up, but will not be
risking his right to recover for a tortious wrong.
CONCLUSION
Over 49,000 Americans died as a result of automobile accidents
An additional 3,600,000 were injured. The financial loss from
1965.
in
these deaths and injuries was $8,500,000,000.5 It is predicted that in
1975 approximately 100,000 Americans will perish in highway accidents.5
Well-documented studies have indicated that seat belts are effective in
53
preventing deaths and reducing injuries caused by automobile accidents.
Notwithstanding the aforementioned data, the majority view is that
tortious significance should not be attached to the failure to use an
available seat belt.
Until the following arguments are overcome the majority view's
position seems likely to prevail in the future. There are conflicting
opinions concerning the safety value of seat belts; therefore, it would
seem as if a legislature directive is needed before the courts should impose
a duty of use of the seat belt. The evaluation of seat belt effectiveness
could best be determined by the legislature and should not be a judicial
function. If the court decided to take on the burden of determining seat
belt effectiveness, an even more difficult burden would be placed on the
jury. Not only would the jury be required to weigh the variables and
the conflicting expert opinions in regard to the value of the seat belts
in order to determine whether a particular plaintiff was negligent, but
the jury would need to determine the difficult question of causation. Due
to the numerous variables which are involved in an automobile accident,
could the jury confidently say that the plaintiff's injuries would not have
56
occurred had the seat belt been worn?
52 See Roethe, Seat Belt Negligence in Automobile Accidents, 1967 Wis. L. REv.

288,297.
Hearings on S. 3005 Before the Comm. on Commerce, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., ser.
89-49, at 133 (1966)
54 See S. REP. No. 1301, 89th Cong. 2d Sess. 1 (1966).
53

55 See Generally 16 AM. JuR. Proof of Facts, §§1-58 (1965).
56 See generally Comment, Seat Belt Legislation and Judicial Reaction, 42 ST. JOHN'S
L. REv. 371, 391 (1968).
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There are other arguments which indeed support the soundness of the
majority view's position. The application of the contributory negligence
doctrine to nonuse of available seat belts might in fact undermine the
judicially recognized presumption that until reasons to the contrary be
established, other users of the highways will act with due care. The trend
in contemporary tort law has been to more effectively compensate the
victim for loss. A manifestation of this trend has been the57contraction of
unduly severe doctrines which entirely preclude recovery.
The advocates of the minority view (tortious significance should be
attached to the failure to use an available seat belt) should be reminded
that there are indeed some inherent rebuttable presumptions to be
considered in relation to the arguments that urge the application of the
seat belt defense. The apparent inability to prove a relationship between
the injuries sustained and the failure to use an available seat belt is a
material problem that should be resolved before nonuse can be deemed
58
as contributory negligence.
Another dilemma evolves in regard to the availability of seat belts.
The state seat belt statutes require installation of the belts after a specified
59
date of manufacture, sale, or other transfer of the vehicle; and most
6°
statutes require only installation of front seat belts. Therefore, an
argument can be asserted that it would be inequitable and unsound to
place tortious significance only to the occupants of cars manufactured
after the prescribed date within the state statute, and perhaps only to the
front seat occupants. A second argument would be related to the state
61
statutes, of which fourteen states are involved, which require merely that
the vehicle be equipped with seat belts. The dilemma would be the

57

id. at 391-392.

5SSee Cierpisz v. Singleton, 247 Md. 215, 230 A. 2d 629 (1967); Brown v. Kendrick,

192 So. 2d 49 (Fla. App. 1966); Barry v. Coca-Cola Co., 99 N.J. Super 270, 239 A.
2d 273 (1967); Bertsch v. Spears, 20 Ohio App. 2d 137, 252 N.E. 2d 194 (1969);
Kavanagh v. Butorac, 140 Ind. App. 139, 221 N.E. 2d 824 (1966); Jones v. Dague,
252 S.C. 261, 166 S.E. 2d 99 (1969); Brown Drilling Co. v. Nieman, 418 S.W. 2d
337 (Tex. App. 1967).

59See GEORGIA CODE ANN. 68-1801 (1964); INDIANA STAT. ANN. 47, §2241 (1963);
IOWA CODE ANN. 321.445 (1965); KANSAS STAT. ANN. 8-5, 135 (Supp. 1970); MAINE
ANN. STAT. 29, §1368-A 1965); MARYLAND ANN. CODE 66%, 12-412 (1970);
MICHIGAN LAWS ANN. §257.710b (1963); MINNESOTA STAT. ANN. 169.685 (Supp.

(1963);
1965);
STAT. 64-20-75 (Supp. 1963); N. CAROLINA GEN. STAT. 20-135.2 (1965);
CENT. CODE 39-21-41.1 (1965); OHIO REV. CODE §4513.262 (Supp. 1965);

1971); Mississippi CODE ANN. §8254.5 (1962); MIsSOURI STAT. ANN. 304.555
MONTANA REV. CODE 32.21, 150.1 (1965); N. JERSEY STAT. 39:3-76.2 (Supp.
N.

MEXICO

N.

DAKOTA

OKLAHOMA

(1962);
1970);

STAT.

ANN.

47, §12-413 (1965);

TENNESSEE CODE ANN.
WASHINGTON

REv.

CODE

RHODE ISLAND

59-930 (1963);

GEN. LAWS

VIRGINIA CODE

46.37.510 (1963); W.

31-23-39

46.1-309.1 (Supp.

VIRGINIA CODE

§17C-15-43

(1964); WISCONSIN STAT. 347.48 (1969).
60 Id.
61 See Appendix I infra.
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situation in which the vehicle was equipped with seat belts but for some
reason they were not readily available for use. The jury would be hard
pressed to decide when a particular plaintiff would be justified in nonuse
of the belt due to the fact that it was not readily available for use.
Another difficult problem arises as to the doctrine of avoidable
consequences. Could a jury, indeed could an expert, adequately determine
what portion of the plaintiff's injury was received because of nonuse
of the seat belt? Is this a determination that can be made rationally;
or is it one that might breed prejudice, emotionally based verdicts, or
pure speculation?
The advocate of the seat belt defense would assert that a reasonable
man would in fact use an available seat belt. Is it a valid statement that
a substantial percentage of the public accept all the safety facts espoused
by experts as to the effectiveness of the seat belt? The fact that some
experts challenge the effectiveness of the seat belt as a safety device,
coupled with the fear that some people have in regard to the seat belt as
related to an accident involving either fire or water, gives rise to the
question of does, or would, a reasonable man use a seat belt.
Another problem arises as to the fact that in spite of the studies
indicating the effectiveness of the seat belt as a safety device, acceptance
of the belt by the public has not been realized. Legally, it might be wiser
to insist that the social utility of wearing seat belts be established in the
minds of the public before nonuse is deemed as negligence. The courts,
in tort law, should avoid imposing a standard of due care that fails to
actually represent that of the general public.
Finally, is the risk of an automobile accident so high, when
considered on a percentage basis, that the courts should hold that there
is a duty to foresee another person's possible negligence and to therefore
protect yourself by wearing a seat belt? What is troublesome here is just
where does foreseeability stop in tort law? If a plaintiff would have the
duty to foresee another driver's possible negligence and thus protect
himself by using a seat belt, might it be argued, by analogy, that the
same plaintiff had the duty to foresee such possible negligence and
therefore should have stopped at a green light? If the courts expand the
foreseeability element too far, absurd results shall emerge.
In conclusion, it may reasonably be asserted that tortious significance
should not be attached to a plaintiff's nonuse of an available seat belt.
Most courts that have reviewed the seat belt defense have looked with
disfavor upon a defendant's attempt to invoke the seat belt defense. It
would seem wiser, as many courts indicated, to leave the seat belt issue
to the legislature's determination. It should be noted that U.S. Department
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of Transportation has proposed a plan 6 2 to force manufacturers to install
seat belts with ignition interlocks. Under this proposed plan, manufacturers would install seat belts with ignition interlocks in the front seating
positions. The interlock system would prevent the engine from starting if a
front seat occupant failed to buckle his seat belt. However, unfastening the
seat belt would not stop the engine after it was started. The aforementioned plan is evidence as to the government's involvement in regard to
the seat belt. The executive and legislative branches are better equipped to
evaluate the effectiveness of the seat belt as a safety device; and it would
therefore seem logical to leave such a determination to them. If the courts
should undertake such a determination, and attach legal consequences to
the conclusion drawn, the danger of confusion and/or conflict with the
seemingly oncoming legislative/ executive determination is apparent.
JoHN P. MURPHY, JR.

62 36 Fed. Reg. 19266 (1971).
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APPENDIX I
This appendix indicates the various types of seat belt legislation relevant
to this casenote.
Column
1*

STATUTE

Column
lI*

Column
111"

CONNECTICUT GEN. STAT. ANN.

§14-100a (Supp. 1970)
GEORGIA CODE ANN. 68-1801 (1964)
ILLINOIS STAT. ANN. 952, §12-603 (Supp.

X
X
1972) X

47, §2241 (1963)
321.445 (1965)
KANSAS STAT. ANN. 8-5, 135 (Supp. 1970)
KENTUCKY REV. STAT. ANN. 189.125 (1962).
MAINE ANN. STAT. 29, §1368-A (1965)
MARYLAND ANN. CODE 662, §12-412 (1970)
MICHIGAN LAWS ANN. §257.710b (1963)
MINNESOTA STAT. ANN. 169.685 (Supp. 1971)
MISSISSIPPI CODE ANN. §8254.5 (1962)
MISSOURI STAT. ANN. 304.555 (1963)
MONTANA REV. CODE 32.21, 150.1 (1965)
NEBRASKA REV. STAT. 39-7, 123.05 (1968)
NEW JERSEY STAT. 39:3-76.2 (Supp. 1965)
NEW MEXICO STAT. 64-20-75 (Supp. 1963)
INDIANA STAT. ANN.
IOWA CODE ANN.

X

X

NEW YORK VEH. AND TRAFFIC LAWS

§383 (Supp. 1968)
N.
N.

20-135.2 (1965)
39-21-41.1 (1965)
OHIO REV. CODE §4513.262 (Supp. 1965)
OKLAHOMA STAT. ANN. 47, §12-413 (1965)
OREGON REV. STAT. §483.482 (1963)
RHODE ISLAND GEN. LAWS 31-23-39 (1962)
TENNESSEE CODE ANN. 59-930 (1963)
VERMONT STAT. ANN. 23, §4 (29) (1963)
VIRGINIA CODE 46.1-309.1 (Supp. 1970)
WASHINGTON REV. CODE 46.37.510 (1963)
CAROLINA GEN. STAT.
DAKOTA CENT. CODE

X
X

W. VIRGINIA CODE §17C-15-43 (1964)
WISCONSIN STAT.

347.48 (1969)
TOTALS

X
14

15

5

* The state statutes in Column I indicate that seat belts are to be equipped in
the motor vehicle. Those in Column II indicate that seat belts are to be installed
for use within the motor vehicle. The statutes in Column III expressly declare
that nonuse of seat belts is inadmissible in an action brought for damages; or,
that nonuse of a seat belt is not deemed as negligence and not to be considered
as a damage mitigating factor.
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II. WHAT THE COURTS SHOULD DO AND WHY

R

V. BOHN' represents only the second reported decision in this
state confronting the Ohio judiciary with the "Seat-Belt Defense."
2
Consistent with their previous decision in Bertsch v. Spears, the court
in Roberts said that:
OBERTS

In the absence of a statute to the contrary, there is no common law
duty imposed upon an occupant of an automobile to wear a seat belt
available seat
in ordinary vehicular travel and the failure to use an
3
belt is not contributory negligence as a matter of law.
Upon closer scrutiny of the instant case, the court's disposition of
the seat-belt defense seems cursory and its unreserved negation of the
defense's applicability in tort law appears untenable. Indeed, as shall be
made clear, only a few jurisdictions, having been confronted with the
defense, have remained pertinacious to the belief that seat belt use is
a matter for the legislature. Those few jurisdictions contend that without a
legislative mandate, the defense continues to be in no way apposite to
an automobile negligence action.
In reality, the judiciary's call for legislative action has been answered.
Legislative regulation concerning seat belts has been enacted to the extent
4
that obvious practical limitations permit. In the end, the burden rests
with the legal profession and more particularly, with the bench.
The plaintiff in Roberts sustained personal injuries when her vehicle
collided with that of the defendant. A general verdict was rendered at the
trial level in favor of the defendant. The plaintiff's appeal was founded
upon several assignments of error, five of which specifically concerned
the seat belt defense; their disposition is set out below:
1. The determination as to whether an occupant of an automobile
should or should not be required to wear a seat belt should be
left to the Legislature.
2. In the absence of a statute to the contrary, there is no duty on an
occupant of an automobile to wear a seat belt in ordinary
vehicular travel, and the failure to use an available seat belt is
not contributory negligence as a matter of law.
3. Evidence of the failure of an occupant of an automobile to use
an available seat belt is generally not admissible in an action for
personal injuries arising out of an automobile accident.

126 Ohio App. 2d 50, 269 N.E. 2d 53 (1971).
2 20 Ohio App. 2d 137, 252 N.E. 2d 194 (1969).
3 26 Ohio App. 2d at 56, 269 N.E. 2d at 58.
4 This point is discussed infra beginning at page 148 and continuing through page 150

of the text.
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4. An automobile is not an inherently dangerous instrumentality. It
only becomes dangerous because of its negligent operation or
because it is allowed to be out of repair.
5. In the absence of any statute to the contrary, there is no duty
on the part of an occupant of an automobile to anticipate
another's negligence and to protect his own safety by such
5
precautions as wearing available seat belts.
To define the seat belt defense would be to obfuscate its scope and
straiten its applicability. It seems to have originated from an automobile
negligence action in a Wisconsin Circuit Court in 1964.6 The plaintiff was
not using her seat belt when her vehicle collided with that of the
defendant. The trial judge submitted the issue of her failure to use
the installed seat belt to the jury. The jury found the omission to be
negligence and reduced her award by ten per cent. There is no statutory
mandate in Wisconsin that seat belts are to be utilized.
The Wisconsin
statute, Section 347.48, only requires seat belts to be installed. Noting this
limited statutory directive, the trial judge concluded, "It... must follow
that the legislature intended that these seat belts be used in certain
circumstances." 7
In less than a decade since Stockinger, the defense has been
presented numerous times. In 1967, the Wisconsin Supreme Court ruled
that since their statute, compelling seat belt installation in automobiles
after 1962,8 did not also compel their use, it was not negligence per se
to fail to use them.9 However, the court did conclude there was a duty,
founded on common law standards, to use an available seat belt.
Explaining, they said, "[I]t is obvious that, on the average, persons using
seat belts are less likely to sustain serious injury and if injured, the
injuries are likely to be less serious."' 10
The significance of this case is to be found in the holding of the
Wisconsin Supreme Court that:
...[W]here

seat belts are available and there is evidence before the
jury indicating a causal relationship between the injuries sustained
and the failure to use seat belts, it is proper and necessary to instruct
the jury in that regard."

526 Ohio App. 2d at 50-51, 269 N.E. 2d at 53.
6 Stockinger v. Dunisch (Sheboygan County Circuit Court, Wisconsin, 1964), reported
in 5 FOR TuE DEFENSE, No. 10 at 79 (1964).
71d.
8 Wis. STATS. ANN. §347.48 (1969).
9

Bentzler v. Braun, 34 Wis. 2d 362, 149 N.W. 2d 626 (1967).
lo ld. at 386, 149 N.W. 2d at 640.
1Id.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol5/iss1/6

16

Trerilla: Seat Belt Defense

Winter, 1972]

SEAT BELT DEFENSE

In Texas, the defense was not only presented, but was also accepted.
The jury, deciding the case of Vernon v. Droeste,12 found that the
plaintiff's failure to wear the available safety harness with which the car
was equipped, constituted contributory negligence. The plaintiff's recovery
was therefore reduced ninety-five per cent.
Texas is a contributory negligence state and has no statute making
the installation of seat belts mandatory. However, in the Vernon case, the
duty to wear an available seat belt or safety harness and the apportionment of damages attributed to the plaintiff's contributory negligence, were
based on the common law principles discussed in Defense Memo, "Seat
Belt Liability." Two of these principles are that the plaintiff has a duty to
use reasonable care for his own safety and that where the plaintiff's prior
conduct does not bring about the impact or accident but has aggravated
that
the ensuing damages, the plaintiff's recovery is reduced to the.extent
14
his damages have been aggravated as a result of his own conduct.
In spite of the foregoing, the court in Roberts states they prefer the
authority of the majority of cases that:
...[T]he determination as to whether an occupant of an automobile
should or should not be required to wear a seat belt should be left
to the Legislature. In the absence of a statute to the contrary, there
is no common law duty imposed upon an occupant of an automobile
to wear a seat belt in ordinary vehicular travel, and the failure to
use an available seat belt is not contributory negligence as a
matter of law.u
The court quite correctly echoed the status of seat belt use pursuant
to the concept of negligence as a matter of law, to wit: the failure to use
the available belt absent a compelling statute, is not negligence as a matter
of law. However, it is from this accepted rule that the court concludes:
Therefore, evidence on the failure of an occupant of an automobile
to use an available seat belt is generally not admissible in an action
for personal injuries arising out of an automobile accident. 16
The above quotation, in the context it is written and used by the
court, must be considered a non-sequitur. It illogically ignores any
rational argument founded upon common law principles as to a duty to
use seat belts (which arguments, the court denounced later therein).

2

1

Vernon v. Droeste (District Court of Brazos County, Texas 1966). Discussed in7

FOR THm DEFENSE, No. 7 at 49 (1966).
137 FOR TiE DEFENSE, No. 2, Feb. 1966. See also 7 FOR THE DEFENSE, No. 6,

June 1966.
14 Supra note 12, at 53.
'526 Ohio App. 2d at 56, 269 N.E. 2d at 58.
16 Id.
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Contrary to the opinion of the Ohio court, Justice Moran, commenting in his opinion in the Illinois case of Mount v. McClellan, said:
It seems to us the better reasoning favors the admissibility of the
evidence .... The use or non-use of seat belts, and expert testimony,
if any, in relation thereto, is a circumstance which the trier of the
facts may consider, together with all other facts in evidence, arriving
at its conclusion as to whether the plaintiff has exercised due care,
not only to avoid injury
to himself, but to mitigate any injury he
7
would likely sustain.'
As to whether the court in Roberts was correct in stating their
position was aligned with the "majority," one need only analyze the
relevant cases to cast the necessary doubt. Approximately forty-one
decisions have been rendered wherein the defense was argued, but
these concern the law of only twenty-three jurisdictions.' 8 Only half these
jurisdictions have seen the defense at the appellate level.' 9 At the highest
court, only five states and one Canadian province have confronted the
defense, with three of these courts approving it,20 only two rejecting it,n
and one failing to consider its merits at all, due to other factors in
the case.n
To compile the cases in categorical fashion, i.e., defense rejected or
defense accepted, would be numerical surplusage. It is only under the
harsh light of objective scholarship that their force and value become
apparent. Needless to say, because the defense was accepted, it does not
necessarily follow it was also successful. It is unfortunate that this
distinction is not made more often concerning the defense discussed
herein, for in many situations the defense was not even considered due to
other factors in the case. Included therein would be such situations as:
(a) the pleadings did not raise the defense; 3 (b) whether or not plaintiff
neglected to use the available belt was not established; 24 (c) pursuant to
the damages issue, it was not shown that seat belt use would have lessened

1791

Ill. App. 2d 1, 4, 234 N.E. 2d 329, 330-331 (1968).

18 See Appendix I infra.
19
2

Id.

OSee Bentzler v. Braun, 34 Wis. 2d 362, 149 N.W. 2d 626 (1967); Sams v. Sams,

247 S.C. 467, 148 S.E. 2d 154 (1966); Yuan v. Farstad, 62 W.W.R. (N.S.) 645
(B.C. 1967).
21 See Miller v. Miller, 273 N.C. 228, 160 S.E. 2d 65 (1968); Robinson v. Lewis,
254 Ore. 52, 457 P. 2d 483 (1969).
22
Brown v. Bryan, 419 S.W. 2d 62 (Mo. S. Ct. 1967).
23
Lentz v. Schafer, 404 F. 2d 516 (7th Cir. 1968).
24 Fontenot v. Fidelity & Cas. Co. of N.Y., 217 So. 2d 702 (La. App. 1969); Schomer
v. Madigan, 120 Ill. App. 2d 107, 255 N.E. 2d 620 (1970).
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the severity of the injuries or prevented them altogether; 25 and finally (d)
the defense made no request the jury be instructed as to the seat belt
issue.2 6 Thus, despite the fact that the seat belt defense may have been
interposed in the above fourteen cases, for one to thereby assert that its
failure indicates a rejection on the merits in all phases of its application,
would be completely inaccurate. Indeed, unlike the court in the instant
case, one could readily conclude that the defense was at least accepted to
the extent that its elements were admissible as evidence. That those

elements were not properly presented or proven should not reflect upon
the admissibility of the argument.

Having placed Ohio's "majority" in its proper perspective, we look
to those decisions where the defense was considered on its merits and
determine the alternatives.
Absent a statutory mandate compelling a person to wear his or her
safety belt, these courts have all concluded the failure to use one's safety
belt is not negligence as a matter of law.n But what of the consideration
courts have given to the argument that, "under the circumstances of a
given case, a reasonable man of ordinary prudence would have made use
of the available belts?"
The Roberts court would have one believe there could never be a
common law duty to wear seat belts without legislation and the omission
could not be negligence as a matter of law 28 (Emphasis added). It is
interesting to note the court included the phrase "as a matter of law." We
shall dispose of this impossibility when discussing the practical limitations
of legislative action and the extent to which such action has gone to
increase seat belt utilization. Aside from this, the court neglects to look
further and entertain the thought that perhaps there is a common law
duty based upon the standard of ordinary care.

25 Barry v. Coca-Cola Co., 99 N.J. Super. 270, 239 A. 2d 273 (1967); Bertsch v.
Spears, 20 Ohio App. 2d 137, 252 N.E. 2d 194 (1969); Cierpisz v. Singleton,
247 Md. 215, 230 A. 2d 629 (1967); Jones v. Dague, 252 S.C. 261, 166 S.E. 2d 99
(1969); Kavanagh v. Butorac, 140 Ind. App. 139, 221 N.E. 2d 824 (1966); Myles
v. Lee, 209 So. 2d 533 (La. App. 1968); Simpson v. Renman, Civ. No. 332 (N.D.
Ind., Oct. 25, 1967); Tom Brown Drilling Co. v. Nieman, 418 S.W. 2d 337 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1967); Turner v. Pfluger, 407 F. 2d 648 (7th Cir. 1969); Glover v. Daniels,
310 F. Supp. 750 (E.D. Miss. 1970).
26 Brown v. Bryan, 419 S.W. 2d 62 (Mo. 1967).
27
Roberts v. Bohn, 26 Ohio App. 2d 50, 269 N.E. 2d 53 (1971); Bentzler v. Braun,
34 Wis. 2d 362, 149 N.W. 2d 626 (1967); Bertsch v. Spears, 20 Ohio App. 2d 137,
252 N.E. 2d 194 (1969); Cierpisz v. Singleton, 247 Md. 215, 230 A. 2d 629 (1967);
Dillon v. Humphreys, 56 Misc. 2d 211, 288 N.Y.S. 2d 14 (1968); Jones v. Dague, 252
S.C. 261, 166 S.E. 2d 99 (1969); Kavanagh v. Butorac, 140 Ind. App. 139, 221 N.E.
2d 824 (1966); Miller v. Miller, 273 N.C. 228, 160 S.E. 2d 65 (1968); Remington
v. Arndt, 28 Conn. Super. 289, 259 A. 2d 145 (1969); Robinson v. Lewis, 254 Ore. 52,
457 P. 2d 483 (1969); Romankewiz v. Black, 16 Mich. App. 119, 167 N.W. 2d 606
(1969); Tom Brown Drilling Co. v. Nieman, 418 S.W. 2d 337 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
28 26 Ohio App. 2d at 56, 269 N.E. 2d at 58.
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Initially, it must be recognized that five states, Iowa, Maine,
Minnesota, Tennessee and Virginia, have legislative provisions to the
effect that failure to use seat belts shall not be considered as negligence,
or that the proof of the lack of their use is inadmissible in any civil action
for personal injury damages. 29 That these five states would find such a
provision necessary is a strong indication of the plausibility of the seat
belt defense. Certainly the argument could be made that without such
provisions, non-use might be considered contributory negligence.
Further, in the instant case, the court said that: "in the absence
of any statute to the contrary, there is no duty on the part of an
occupant of an automobile ... to protect30 his own safety by such
precautions as wearing available seat belts."
Looking to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, there is apparent
disagreement. There, contributory negligence is conduct which involves
an undue risk of harm to the actor himself. It is conduct on the part of
3
the plaintiff, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered. '
Commenting further, the Restatement says:
An actor is not necessarily required to pursue the same course of
conduct for his own protection as is demanded of him for the
protection of others. There may be circumstances in which a jury
may reasonably conclude that a reasonable man would take more, or
3
less, precaution for the protection of others than for his own safety.
The concern however, is not so much with the Ohio court's holding
on seat belt utilization not being a matter of law. The fear is in the
dictum of the Roberts decision that:
...[E]ven if there was general acceptance of the value of and need
for using seat belts while occupying a motor vehicle, we feel that
there is a serious question as to any legal duty to wear seat belts in
33
the absence of a statute to the contrary.

Such a statement is portentous to the future of this tort trend, when
precipitated by a perfunctory refusal to even consider the merits of the
defense. Such an adumbration for the future should be preceded by an
extensive, if not exhaustive, analysis of the relevant law in that field, as
well as its legislative history.
Undoubtedly, the legislatures have not enacted seat belt legislation so
as to add aesthetic beauty to the motor car. Why then, do some courts still

2 IOWA CODE ANN. 321.445 (1965); ME. REv. STAT. ANN.,
STAT. ANN. 169.685 (Supp. 1971); TENN. CODE ANN.

29, §1368-A (1965); MINN.
59-930 (1963); VA. CODE

46.1-309.1 (Supp. 1970).
30 26 Ohio App. 2d at 58, 269 N.E. 2d at 59.
31 RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF TORTS,

§463, Comment b (1965).

32 d. at §464, Comment f.
33 26 Ohio App. 2d at 57, 269 N.E. 2d at 59.
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await statutes mandating the use of seat belts? I suggest the legislatures
can do no more without exceeding the bounds of logical discretion. Seat
belt installation statutes originated around 1962.34 By 1970, thirty
states had statutes requiring the installation of safety harness or seat belt
devices in automobiles.3 5 Neither the federal standards nor the state
statutes required their use, except in very limited situations. 36 Legislation
requiring seat belt use would be fraught with inequities. Since the statutes
generally require the installation of belts after a specified date of the
manufacture of the vehicle, the question remains as to what date shall
be so specified and what of the vehicles manufactured prior thereto?
Certainly it would not be feasible to require all vehicles to be equipped
with seat belts so a statute compelling their use could be equitably administered. Moreover, what does one do about the particular situations that
develop preventing compliance with the statute? Persons recovering from
or suffering from certain abdominal disorders, complicated pregnancies or
other medical conditions, might be advised that, medically, seat belt use
could be hazardous. Clearly, these persons would be in violation of the
statute and subject to a ruling of negligence per se. Of course, the
legislators could foresee such contingencies and thereby specifically
exclude them from compliance. Yet, can anyone foresee all the possible
exclusory circumstances? I think not, and it is therefore understandable
we have no such compelling legislation. To ask the courts to enforce such
legislation would be to compel them to inequitably administer a standard
of conduct; a far removed thought from the hitherto generally accepted
imposition of a standard of ordinary care. Notwithstanding the legislative
preclusion of such standards, there could certainly be circumstances
wherein the non-use of seat belts would not be a breach of a common law
duty of care. Such exceptions can and do exist in the law of negligence
where extenuating circumstances compel such non-conformity from
37
standard behavior.
Recent legislative developments serve only to substantiate what has
been set out above. They are attempting to compel seat belt use, short of
explicitly commanding so. A recent notice from the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration, Department of Transportation, proposes:

... [T]o allow manufacturers to install seat belts with ignition
interlocks for the period up to August 15, 1975.
... (2) An interlock system would prevent the engine from starting
if any front seat occupants did not have their belts fastened.
34

See Appendix II infra.

35
36

Id.

See CAL. VEH. CODE §27304 (Supp. 1970), (requires use by driver and all passengers in training vehicles). R.I. GEN. LAWS Am. §31-23-41 (Supp. 1963), (requires

use by drivers of certain public transportation and government vehicles).
37 See W. PROSSER, LAw OF TORTS, §65, at 419 n. 26, 27 and 28 (4th ed. 1971).
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(3) In order to prevent defeating the systems by leaving the belts
fastened permanently, it would be necessary to fasten the belts after
an occupant is seated, i.e., the seat sensor and the belt switch would
8
have to operate sequentially, to start the engine.
This option is a response to several manufacturers' requests to delay
the date when passive protection must be provided.
It is intended by this option to provide a high level of seat belt
usage, and to increase the life- and injury-saving effectiveness of
installed belt39systems, in the interim period before passive systems
are required.
I maintain that in light of the above, legislators have done all, save
buckle the belt for you, and that their intent is clear: they (the legislators)
have recognized the need for and value of seat belts and they implicitly
seek to compel their use.
In view of the above, it remains only to consider the judiciary's role
in the seat belt defense consonant with the principles of negligence.
We know contributory negligence is that conduct of the plaintiff
40
which involves or results in an undue risk of harm to himself. Further,
"... the duty of a guest in a car is to exercise reasonable care to avoid
injury." 4' That an automobile is not an inherently dangerous instrumentality is also well recognized. 4 2 However, the fact that seat belts do
prevent or reduce injuries, and deaths, is one so generally recognized, that
4
it could very easily be a matter for judicial notice. 3 The National Safety
Council forever reminds the general public to "Buckle Up For Safety,"
and there are enough thoroughly documented studies that prove conclusively that seat belts are effective devices to prevent or lessen injuries
and death."
With the incessant education we have received of late, the general
public either knows, or should know, of the increased risk of being
involved in an automobile accident and the effectiveness of the seat belt
protective devices available to them.
Yet, the Roberts court, in the face of overwhelming statistical data,
clings tenaciously to what seems to be, at best, a tenuous proposition of
law that, ".... in spite of an intensive campaign to promote their use, seat
38 36 Fed. Reg. 19266 (1971).

39id. at 192667. See 36 Fed. Reg. 4600 (amended 36 Fed. Reg. 12858, July 1971).

Referring here to Standard No. 208, Occupant Crash Protection, 49 C.F.R. §571.21
(1971).
4
OSupra note 31.
418 AM. JUR. 2d Automobiles and Highway Traffic, §524, n. 17 (1963).
42
Williamson v. Eclipse Motor Lines, Inc., 145 Ohio St. 467, 62 N.E. 2d 339 (1945).
43
See 29 AM. JutR. 2d Evidence, §§18, 19 (1963).
4See studies referred to in 1967 Wis. L. Rzv. 288, 292.
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4
Might one be too
belts are not being used by the general public."
presumptuous to conclude that the experts know something the laymen
refuse to acknowledge? We all know how easy it is to adopt the "it
can't happen to me attitude." Cigarette smoking in light of the Surgeon
General's Report is indicative of this attitude.

Despite the court's reference to the public's non-use of seat belts,
should the standard of ordinary care represent the custom of the general
public? Custom is not conclusive, nor does it necessarily meet the test
of reasonableness espoused in tort law. Perhaps one need be reminded
4
"
that the reasonable man of ordinary prudence is a fictitious person.
The actor is required to do what such an ideal individual is
supposed to do in his place.... He is not to be identified with any
ordinary individual, who might occasionally do unreasonable things;
he is a prudent and careful man, who is always up to standard... he
is rather a personification of a community ideal47of reasonable behavior, determined by the jury's social judgment. (Emphasis added).
How then, can the Ohio judiciary imply that such a paragon of
prudence would openly flaunt the factual effectiveness of seat belts as well
as the legal principles that require he use reasonable care for his own
safety? Further, if it is to be the jury's social judgment that must
characterize the particular behavior acceptable to that community, and
not the court's, it is clear that the court invaded the province of the jury
in refusing to admit the evidence. Indeed, stating later that were such
comconduct (not wearing seat belts) unacceptable to the particular
48
admissibility.
its
refuse
to
continuing
at
hints
court
munity, the
I would hope it foreseeable by now that there is at least a plausible
argument that there may be a common law duty to wear an available seat
belt, the breach of which may constitute contributory negligence under
certain circumstances. Hopefully, when next confronted with such a
defense, the Ohio court will permit the jury to decide the issue.
Further, in analyzing foreseeability as an element that might create
the duty to wear available seat belts, the Roberts court said: "there is
no duty on the part of an occupant of an automobile to anticipate
another's negligence and to protect his own safety by such precautions
49
as wearing available seat belts."
It cannot be gainsaid that this is a standard to which the "ever
prudent reasonable man" would adhere. Accident probability is very high

"26 Ohio App. 2d at 56, 269 N.E. 2d at 58.
46Supra note 37, at 150.
471d. at 150-151, n. 19-20.
48 26 Ohio App. 2d at 57, 269 N.E. 2d at 59.
49 Id. at 58, 269 N.E. 2d at 59.
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today and it is common knowledge that its ever increasing frequency and
severity are becoming a national problem. For one to posit that others
will exercise proper care is hardly a safe absolute. Since the risk of auto
accidents has increased, as has the danger of severe damage, it seems
hardly unreasonable to anticipate possible negligence by any man.
In view of recent highway safety campaigns by the National Safety
Council and other national groups, it is virtually inconceivable that
prudence would permit a reasonable man to engage in vehicular travel
with little or no concern for defensive behavior. The emphasis today is
certainly that a motorist cannot rely on the assumption that others will
obey the rules of the road. Hence, the slogan, "Watch out for the other
guy!" Advertisements through members of the media admonish today's
motorist that if he relies on the fact he has the right of way, he may be
right but "dead right." Similarly, driver educational programs have been
implemented nationwide to facilitate the public's knowledge of defensive
driving. With such a national recognition that one must anticipate the
possible negligence of others, it is indefensible that one could be considered reasonably prudent when not employing his or her seat belt.
Despite the fact that one may now be convinced that either there is
a common law duty to wear an available seat belt or that the argument
as a defense is at least plausible, the inherent difficulty still remains
in the contributory negligence states like Ohio, that such negligence,
however slight, completely bars recovery. The hesitation, of course, is
that the failure to wear a seat belt could rarely be a proximate cause
of the accident, so to bar recovery is thought too harsh.
The author feels, however, this inquiry is not consistent with the
elements of a defense founded upon the theory of contributory negligence.
Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the plaintiff which
falls below the standard to which he should conform for his own protection and which is a legally contributing cause co6perating with the
negligence of the defendant in bringing about the plaintiff's harm. 50
The above rather strongly suggests that the appropriate question is
not whether the plaintiff's negligence contributed to the cause of the
accident, but rather whether it contributed to the harm the plaintiff has
suffered. By way of illustration, the Restatement confirms the above:
A is negligently driving an automobile at excessive speed. B's
negligently driven car crosses the center line of the highway and
scrapes the side of A's car, damaging its fenders. As a result A loses
control of his car, which goes into the ditch, where A's car is wrecked
and A suffers personal injuries. The evidence supports the conclusion
that A's excessive speed was not a contributing cause of the collision,

50 Supra note 31,

at §463.
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but was a substantial factor in causing his car to go into the ditch.
On the basis of such evidence, A may recover for the damage to his
fenders but not for the subsequent damage to his car or for his
51
personal injuries.
If the inquiry as to the plaintiff's contributory negligence was
restricted to "cause of the accident," the plaintiff would have been found
free from such negligence and entitled to full recovery. However, since
the proper analysis is whether the plaintiff's act or acts contributed to the
harm, the finding of contributory negligence is sustained.
This example further illustrates the need for the courts to spawn
a bifurcated theory of negligence. Such a development would further
dispel the courts' fears of applying contributory negligence to the seat belt
defense. Indeed this dichotomy need exist since a plaintiff's failure to
"buckle-up" should not necessarily preclude recovery for damage to his
vehicle. If the plaintiff's negligent conduct, along with that negligent
conduct of the defendant, was found to be the proximate cause of the
accident, the plaintiff should not expect to recover for damages so
occasioned to his property or person. If, on the other hand, the plaintiff's
negligent conduct contributed only to his personal injuries, then it
necessarily follows that he is contributorily negligent solely in that
regard and accordingly should be barred from recovering those damages
consistent therewith.
In the end, the error seems to have been the court's misapplication
of the concept of "proximate cause" and to what inquiry that concept
should be directed. Certainly the consideration must be directed to the
damages for without damages, there is no tort.52 Additionally, "it follows
that the statute of limitations does not begin to run against a negligent
action until some damage has occurred." 53
This very misapplication or confusion leads one to believe that
perhaps there is credence to the following:
(c) The very confusion and lack of meaning in the term "proximate
cause" has sometimes allowed courts to avoid the logical consequences of an urndesirable doctrine when they are unwilling to
repudiate it or to undertake the intellectual rigor required for
working out rational exceptions to it.54
In such a situation, there is perhaps another doctrine, similar to
contributory negligence, which may be utilized. The rule of "avoidable

52

Id. at §465, Comment c.
Supra note 37, at §30.

53

Id.

54

James, Contributory Negligence, 62

51
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consequences" denies recovery for any damages which could have been
5
avoided by reasonable conduct on the part of the plaintiff.In a limited number of situations, the plaintiff's unreasonable
conduct, although it is prior or contemporaneous, may be found
to have caused only a separable part of the damage. In such a
it is called contributory negligence, the apportioncase, even though 56
ment will be made.
At this point we should refer again to Justice Moran who restricted
the applicability of the seat belt defense by saying:
However, this element should be limited to the damage issue of the
case and should not be considered by the trier of the facts in
determining the liability issue. Whether a person has or has not
would have no relevancy in
availed himself of the use of seat belts
57
determining the cause of an accident.
Thus, it appears that though the doctrine of contributory negligence
may seem too harsh, for the present, for some courts, at least the concept
of avoidable consequences should be acceptable for apportioning damages.
The damages are to be compensatory, not profitable. As such, the plaintiff
should not be permitted to further recover for those damages which
through his own negligence he could either have avoided or perhaps
prevented.
In the last analysis, the only conclusion that can be drawn with any
degree of certainty is that a mere installation statute, coupled with
non-use of the seat belt, is not negligence per se. Contrary to the assertion
of the Ohio court, the number of courts which have rejected all phases
of the defense is relatively small. Most courts seem to have either accepted
the defense, rejected only one phase of it, or indicated it would be
acceptable in the proper circumstance. Unfortunately, the majority of
courts have yet to even face the defense.
One thing is certain: the case of Roberts v. Bohn should have given
the seat belt defense more consideration. Roberts' surface treatment of
the law in this area cannot be considered definitive or exhaustive. The
better rule seems to be, therefore, that if competent evidence can show a
causal connection between the failure to use seat belts and the resultant
injuries, the admissability of such evidence should not be withheld from
the jury, simply because the court objects to the particular legal theory
as a defense. If the legal theory can properly place the fault upon he who
caused the harm, then justice would best be served by admitting the facts
and instructing the jury thereby permitting the trier of the facts to serve
their function. I see none of the courts' fear in so doing.
JoHN

A. TERILLA

55 Supra note 37, at 423.
56

Id.

57 Mount v. McClellan, 91 IIl. App. 2d at 5, 234 N.E. 2d at 331 (1968); e.g., Sonnier
v. Ramsey, 424 S.W. 2d 684 (Texas Civ. App. 1968).
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APPENDIX II
Seat Belt InstallationStatutes
CONNECTICUT GEN. STAT. ANN. §14-100a (Supp. 1970).
GEORGIA CODE ANN. §68-1801 (1964).
ILLINOIS STAT. ANN. 95A, §12-603 (Supp. 1972).
INDIANA STAT. ANN. 47, §2241 (1963).
IOWA CODE ANN. 321.445 (1965).
KANSAS STAT. ANN. 8-5, 135 (Supp. 1970).
KENTUCKY REV. STAT. ANN. 189.125 (1962).
MAINE ANN. STAT. 29, §1368-A (1965).
§12-412 (1970).
MARYLAND ANN. CODE 66,
MICHIGAN LAWS ANN. §257.710b (1963).
MINNESOTA STAT. ANN. 169.685 (Supp. 1971).
MissiSSp'pI CODE ANN. §8254.5 (1962).
MISSOURI STAT. ANN. 304.555 (1963).
MONTANA REV. CODE 32.21, 150.1 (1965).
NEBl ASKA REv. STAT. 39-7, 123.05 (1968).
NEW JERSEY STAT. ANN. 39:3-76.2 (Supp. 1965).
NEw MEXICO STAT. 64-20-75 (Supp. 1963).
NEW YORK VEH. AND TRAFFIC LAWS §383 (Supp. 1968).
N. CAROLINA GEN. STAT. 20-135.2 (1965).
N. DAKOTA CENT. CODE 39-21-41.1 (1965).
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §4513.262 (Supp. 1965).
OKLAHOMA STAT. ANN. 47, §12-413 (1965).
OREGON REv. STAT. §483.482 (1963).
RHODE ISLAND GEN. LAWS 31-23-39 (1962).
TENNESSEE CODE ANN. 59-930 (1963).
VERMONT STAT. ANN. 23, §4(29) (1963).
VIRGINIA CODE 46.1-309.1 (Supp. 1970).
WASHINGTON REV. CODE 46.37.510 (1963).
W. VIRGINIA CODE §17C-15-43 (1964).
WISCONSIN STATS. 347.48 (1969).

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol5/iss1/6

28

